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MUSLIMS IN POST-COMMUNIST BULGARIA
Janice Broun1
Janice Broun (Scottish Episcopal Church) graduated from Oxford University. She has
written prolifically about churches in Eastern Europe, including articles in this
publication, including several on the Bulgarian Orthodox schism (see June 1993 and
April 2004).

Western attention to Bulgaria's substantial Muslim Turkish community was
briefly aroused in 1984-85 when reports seeped out of a brutal campaign to assimilate
it and force its members to change to Slav ‘Christian’ names - ironic, in a communist
state responsible for the deaths and persecution of hundreds of Christians. In 1989, it
was again in the news when Todor Zhivkov's government expelled 370,000 Turks, a
move which aroused widespread protests and helped prompt the resistance which led
to the regime's eventual collapse.
Around 152,000 Turks returned and the community set about restoring the
structures of its former life and undoing the damage that four decades of communism
had done to it. The Communist Party had, admittedly, improved educational and social
conditions in the main Muslim areas which are in the north east and south of the
country, but the aim of this policy had been to ensure a secularised elite which could
be integrated within a socialist and increasingly nationalistic Bulgarian nation.2 At the
same time, it suppressed religious identification. Only around 100 of its 2300 mosques
had been left open, and they were barred to all but elderly men (women habitually
pray at home). The property of “Waqf” (charitable foundations) was confiscated. The
closure of the madrassah in Sofia and all Muslim high schools for four decades left the
younger generation bereft of any systematic instruction. Only a few token muftis,
carefully selected by the security services, had received such training as was necessary
to enable them to provide a veneer of normality amd fulfill basic duties - and also to
monitor the activities of their co-religionists. Chief mufti Nedim Gendzhev, for
This is a shortened version of my article, “Rehabi1itation and Recovery: Bulgaria's Muslim
Communities”, Religion, State and Society, Vol 35 number 2 June 2007, p.105, which should be consulted if
greater detail is required.
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instance, had worked in the interior ministry for years before being sent to Syria for
six months to brush up his knowledge of Islam. These people could hardly be regarded
as representing the genuine feelings of their community. In a survey in 1985 55 per cent
of Turks declared that they were religious, compared with 25 per cent of ethnic
Bulgarians - an impressive proportion, considering the worsening persecution.3 In the
same year that the Chief mufti and regional muftiate (with one exception) signed a
public declaration that Islam enjoyed complete freedom, the speaking of Turkish in.
public and the wearing of distinctive Muslim clothes, and participation in Muslim rites
of passage were banned. Graveyards too were uprooted, Muslim names effaced.
Nevertheless, basic religious practises had been so sapped that even after
persecution ceased in 1995 and though between thirty and forty-one percent claimed
to pray regularly, only 1.9 per cent of young men attended Friday prayers, most of the
fifteen to twenty percent who did being elderly or peasants.
Movement for Rights and Freedom
Muslims had played a key role in the democratic opposition to bring down
communism and soon formed their own political party, the Movement for Rights and
Freedoms (MRF), which has been represented in every Assembly since 1990. However,
under their leader Akhmed Dogan, the most astute of post-communist politicians in
Bulgaria, they were careful to avoid identification with any extremist Islamist or
pan-Turkic elements, which were almost non-existent anyway. Although the MRF has
ensured that Muslim rehabilitation and interests are addressed, it is secular and open
to anyone.
The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP - the re-cycled communists), which
dominated the 1990-91 and 1992-97 governments, tried unsuccessfully to have it
bannned in 1992. Its policies have been moderating and sensible. It was generally
supported by the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) governments of 1991-92 and
1997-2001. It became a coalition partner in the returned king Simeon
W Hopkin, “From religious identity to ethnic mobilisation: the Turks of Bulgaria before, under
and since Communism,” in H Poulton and S. Taji-faruki, (eds), Muslim Identity and the Balkan State,
(London, Hurst), pp54-82, quoted by Merdjanova.
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Sakskobburggoski's government, (the Simeon II National Movement, SIINM) from
2001-05. When that fell, like the previous UDF government, unable to live up to
people's expectations of a real economic recovery and an end to rampant corruption,
it switched to help prop up the BSP party which only had 31 percent of the votes and
again became a coalition party. Such pragmatic maneuvers did not endear the MRF to
the Bulgarian population. A more valid criticism of the MRF might be its failure to
represent the interests of the non-Turkish Muslim groups.
Growth of Hostility
According to the 2001 census, Muslims constituted 12.2 percent of the
population, numbering 967,000, but of these 371,000 were Roma, Bulgaria's most
impoverished, marginalised and victimised community, who gravitate towards
adopting the faith of the community they live nearest to and whose religious allegiance
is, with rare exceptions, cosmetic. They and the Slavophone Muslims of the Rhodope
mountain region in south western Bulgaria, nicknamed derogatively “Pomaks”, but
denied self-identification in censuses, tend to switch identities so as to minimise
antagonising the communities which surround them. More realistic estimates are that
there are 700,000 to 800,000 Roma, 600,000 to 700,000 Turks, and 200,000 to 270,000
Pomaks.
The survival and resilience of the Muslim community gives rise to conflicting
emotions among the predominantly, though normally nominal, Orthodox Bulgarians.
Some, including most of those who are near neighbours, regard them positively,
respecting them as more honest, hardworking and reliable than themselves, though
they have no wish to intermarry. But a significant element (about a fifth) of ethnic
Bulgarians, spread fairly evenly over the social strata, now regard Turks and Roma as
alien. Partially this attitude reflects their fear that eventually they will be swamped
because of the higher Muslim birthrate in a country which has the lowest one in
Europe. The population has declined from over nine million at its highest, and the
estimates are that its current eight million could by 2050 have shrunk to 5.2 million.
Only sixty percent of these would be “genuine” Bulgarians. It is these fears, allied to
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those of an escalation of fundamentalism, which are being exploited by various
nationalist parties, in particular by Ataka (Attack), a fascist party which suddenly
surfaced with the impassioned xenophobic rhetoric of its leader Volen Siderov in the
2005 elections and, to the horror of human rights groups such as the Bulgarian Helsinki
Committee, gained 21 seats in the Assembly with eight percent of the votes. The US
Ambassador found its rhetoric reminiscent of that employed in the early 1990s in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is ironic that in 2006 MRF supporters voted en masse for the
re-election as president of the moderate BSP candidate, Georgi Parvanov, to keep
Siderov out.
In actual fact the Turkish birthrate is also falling, in line with the overall trend
(Roma excepted). This reflects the long running economic and educational decline, and
the impoverishment of the main Turkish regions due to the collapse of the tobacco
market since 1990. Also Muslims, like other Bulgarians, are increasingly seeking work
elsewhere.
Inter Religious Relations and Minority Rights
During his visit to Turkey in 1997 UDF President Petur Stoyanov apologised for
the persecution of Bulgarian Turks during the communist era. Partly thanks to MRF
pressure, but also aware of Bulgaria's forthcoming candidacy for the European
Community, the UDF government established a National Council on Ethnic and
Demographic Issues to research and address the problems of the several national
minorities. It did not prove particularly effective.
Meanwhile the Muslim community was, throughout the post-communist
period, subjected to scrutiny for alleged links with fundamentalist foundations abroad.
The BSP mouthpiece daily ‘Duma’ frequently referred to Bulgaria's Turks as “Turkey's
fifth column.” One particularly unfortunate incident took place on the eve of an
officially sponsored International Islamic Conference visit in 1997 when Plovdiv police
brutally broke up a peaceful seminar in the Rhodope region, confiscated study books
and expelled two instructors. State officials, the Board of Religious Affairs, the Muslim
establishment and people in general fear that foreign foundations might exercise what
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVIII, 1 (February 2008)

page 54

they would regard as a negative influence on local Muslims, luring them into practices
associated with extremist groups, and even, after the atrocities of September 11, plant
terrorist nests on their land. Sensible muftis had warned against them and some
villages had even chased out extremist foreign preachers. It must be admitted that
Bulgaria's Muslims - some Pomak communities excepted - are not noted for their
fervour.
Rites of passage are properly observed, but most Muslims do not fast during
Ramadhan. Many eat pork and alcholism is as common as among “Christians”.
Traditionally, a general atmosphere of tolerance has prevailed; most mixed rural
communities had good neighbourly relations and enjoyed sharing each other's feasts.
During one of the bitterest periods of the Orthodox schism in 2005 Ustina's majority
Muslim community even publicised and protested against what they regarded as the
unjust sacking of the local Orthodox priest Fr. Georgi Koshinov by his Metropolitan
Arseniy, who eventually re-instated him. A Trialogue Group involving Christians,
Muslims and Jews was established in 2001 after Sir Sigmund Sternberg's visit. Muslims
were among the enthusiastic crowds in Plovdiv welcoming Pope John Paul in 2002. The
Orthodox and Muslim establishments respect each other but the Muslims felt insulted,
and joined in demonstrations with Catholics, Protestants and members of the
alternative Orthodox synod outside the Assembly in 2002 to protest against the new,
controversial Law of Confessions, which granted special status to the Bulgarian
Orthodox Church and required all other confessions to register with the Sofia Court.
The Assembly had already twice overlooked a draft proposed by the MRF, which
specified separation of church and state and forbade all state interference in religious
institutions. This would have been very acceptable to other minority groups as well as
to international religious rights standards and the appalling scenes in Orthodox
churches in 2005 would have been avoided.
Divisions within the Muslim Community
A major issue in post-communist societies has been that of removing former
agents of the regimes, notably of compromised clergy collaborators, and replacing them
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with people with ‘clean’ records. In Bulgaria the 1992 UDF government, pushed by
reformists, actually intervened to remove such elements. Unfortunately it did this so
insensitively in both the Orthodox and Muslim establishments as to leave them rent for
years by schisms which are even now not completely resolved. Successive governments
did not learn their lesson and continued to interfere. The duration of the split within
the Muslim community owes much to Gendzhev's adversarial and authoritative
personality. According to Ali Eminov, author of Turkish and other Muslim Minorities in
Bulgaria (London, Hurst and Co. 1997) it has been in Gendzhev's interests to keep the
community divided as long as possible through either controlling the leadership or
challenging successful contenders by court actions.
Neither schism has been motivated by doctrinal matters. Most Muslims are
Hannafi Sunni. The Shia minority, 7.7 per cent, the Turkish speaking Alevi, is
practically confined to tightly knit endogamous impoverished villages where ancient
syncretic practises associated with Sufi orders are preserved. They guard shrines,
‘tekke’ traditionally also venerated by Christians and even non believers. Nowadays
anthropologists seek to help them preserve their colourful customs. They do not face
discrimination unlike their fellow Alevi in Turkey. Only one specific group, 400
Ahmadis, have recently run into difficulties about registration, as required by the Law
of Confessions, probably because the Pakistani government has banned them! Such
tension over the nature of Islam in Bulgaria as exists lies in whether to follow the path
of traditional tolerant Balkan Islam or welcome Arab foundations with their alien
brand of faith, practises and over-generous subsidies.
Both schisms, at root, were power struggles to control material assets. The chief
muftiate could hold properties with exceptional profit potential and access the Arab
subsidies. The Muslim schism was perhaps not as damaging to its community's faith
as the Orthodox schism, which alienated many people who were sympathetic to the
persecuted church and ready to return to a genuinely revived and reformed one, but
who switched to the more vibrant evangelical churches or lost interest in religion
altogether. Nevertheless some towns and villages have become divided, with muftis
and imans shifting from side to side and rival groups refusing to worship in each
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others mosques. The key mover in consistently opposing Gendzhev has been the MRF.
Most believers were on its side and approved of the initial UDF government action in
1992 which removed Gendzhev and his associate muftis from office. Though he claims
to have responded to community needs, by organising the haj, re-opening schools and
the madrassah, building 62 mosques, providing the first Qurans in Bulgarian - a best
seller, though too hastily translated to be entirely accurate - he had confessed to having
been an agent and was widely discredited. When he and his faction were rehabilitated
by the BSP government in 1994 he did not dare put his name forward for chief mufti.
His faction became discredited by its recourse to dubious methods including violence
against its opponents, suspicions that it had diverted charitable endowments to its own
coffers, and replacing of madrassah staff, such as the respected well-educated elderly
rector Ibrahim Yalamov, by unqualified people. So alarmed were some Muslims that
they feared another assimilation campaign was in the offing.
In 1995 mainstream Muslims organised an extraordinary National Conference
and elected as chief mufti Fikri Safi Khasan, a reformist who had MRF approval and
was keen on purging communist elements. In 1997 the MRF allied with the UDF to
topple the BSP government which had brought the country to the brink of collapse. In
the autumn another National Conference met, urged government leaders to refrain
from further interference in their community's internal affairs, banned any former
communists or their agents from future leadership roles and elected the young Mustafa
Alish Khadzi as chief mufti.
Unhappily, its claim to have resolved the schism was premature. September 11
heightened the profile of the Muslim community. At successive annual national
conferences other MRF candidates succeeded Khadzi. Internal squabbles continued,
escalating again in 2003 as Gendzhev took the populist line by accusing chief mufti
Selim Mekhmet of fostering fundamentalist foundations from abroad and the MRF of
manipulating elections. Mekhmet was replaced by Khasan. The situation deteriorated
again. Contestants frequently had recourse to the courts, culminating in 2005 in
contradictory decisions by the Supreme Court and the Sofia Court - responsible under
the 2002 Law of Confessions for registering religious bodies. In 2006 another National
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Conference (though with considerable dissent) confirmed Khadzi, probably the most
constructive, well-qualified and balanced of the candidates. Gendzhev again accused
the MRF of controlling elections and contested the election. However, his past caught
up with him; he was accused of embezzlement, the illegal transfer of a large sum from
the chief mufti's office to his son's private foundation. Typically in a country prey to
appalling corruption and failure to enforce the law against criminals, he has not been
brought to trial.
Religious Education
Because of the economic crisis and the BSP government's hostility towards
Muslims in general and the MRF in particular, the systematic, adequately funded
re-establishment of religious education had to wait for the UDF government's second
rapprochment with Turkey, which followed its victory in the 1997 elections. In an
interesting move promoted by the Bulgarian Muslim religious establishment, in 1998
the Bulgarian Board of Religious Affairs and the Diyanet, its Turkish equivalent, signed
a protocol to protect Bulgarian Muslims. The Diyanet, which promotes a moderate and
modernising brand of Islam within Turkey, undertook the responsibility for funding
and vetting staff appointments for the Sofia madrassah and three high schools,
providing 5000 Qurans and basic textbooks and training 100 students at a summer
school to teach Quran study in villages. This was in line with the agreement between
the Turkish and Bulgarian presidents in 1999 that the Bulgarian authorities would
strive to stall the activities of Muslim fundamentalists. However, teaching Islam in
schools as an elective option, which three quarters of Muslims wanted, had to wait
until 2000, three years after the Bulgarian Orthodox Church gained that right, and then
it was only in Bulgarian, and had to be funded by the chief mufti's office until,
belatedly, the Ministry of Education took over the funding in 2004. Muslim university
and high school students are now keener to identify themselves by their dress - despite
opposition in some schools from formerly communist staff who espouse nationalism.
However, the take up of extra mural study courses in basic Islam has been much lower
than expected. Turkish high school children are taught in Bulgarian, except or three
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hours Turkish a week. Since they also have to study Russian and a west European
language, in practice few have the time or energy left to study Arabic! The Sofia
madrassah, like its Orthodox Christian equivalent, maintains a conservative, traditional
line. The brain drain of the brightest young folk has affected Muslims just as it has
Bulgarians.
Eminov regards education as the key to the proper rehabilitation of Bulgaria's
Muslims. The reconciliation and unification of its feuding elements may have to wait
for an entire new cadre of leaders to be trained, people ready to put the well being of
the Muslim community ahead of self interest. That, he regrets, could take a generation
or more.
Escalation of Tension
In the aftermath of September 11 and the war in Iraq (which was backed by the
MRF) Muslims found themselves in an invidious position. US Embassy officials started
scrutinising any communities which aroused suspicions of extremism. Khaskovo’s
mufti Faik Khadzhimurad pointedly complained that the state's failure to return waqf
properties left Muslims susceptible to donations from various foundations - ‘some of
them not the best ones’. A major concern of his community has been the restitution of
property confiscated during communism, which has lagged behind other confessions.
At a local level many imans, like their counterpart Orthodox village priests, struggle
to live not much above starvation level. The state has been unwilling to return as well
as unable to afford to renovate certain historically significant mosques. In 2004 the
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan urged Simeon to provide official
protection for mosques, just as the Turkish government does.
Chief mufti Mekhmet met Patriarch Maksim to emphasise that Muslims and
Christians were united in their determination to stem the invasion of potentially
harmful sects. The following January Mekhmet attended the world peace pilgrimage
to Assisi with the chief muftis of Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina to re-affirm their
traditional Balkan acceptance of pluralism and amicable co-existance with other
confessions. Unhappily, this tolerance does not apply to Muslim relations with
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Evangelicals. Those who work in Muslim areas are regarded and resented as
proselytisers. Some have been given short shrift and failed to get redress for injuries
suffered. MRF local councillors often show their hostility by refusing to lease them
public halls. There is also widespread unease among Muslims about the Orthodox St.
John the Forerunner Movement, founded by a Pomak priest, Fr. Boyan Saraev, in 1991.
Its specific aim is to bring back Pomaks, popularly believed by Bulgarians to be
descendents of Christians forcibly converted by the Turks, to their ‘original’ faith.
Becoming Orthodox is also a convenient way to move up in society. The Orthodox Holy
Synod disapproves of the movement because it could upset the long established
balance between faiths in Bulgaria.
In line with the (widely unpopular) government support of US policy in Iraq,
Mekhmet was sent to the USA in 2003 to meet official Muslim representatives there.
Former UDF prime minister Ivan Kostov, who was manifesting increasingly populist
and anti-Islamic tendencies and had created a new party, warned of Bulgaria's danger
of being exposed to terrorist attacks as a result of its one-sided government policy.
Gendzhev, and his allies too, jumped on the anti-terrorist, anti-Saudi Arabia
bandwagon. Surnitsa, a village remote in the Rhodope mountains among the Pomak
community, was twice subject to official and press visits, in 2001 and 2004 because they
claimed that its college principal was a Wahhabi who ‘harboured a terrorist nest.’ The
investigators found that the college was licensed by the Supreme Muslim Council,
taught the more liberal type of Sunni Islam which it favoured, and that in six years only
one student had gone to stay abroad. Local people expressed their concern that adverse
publicity could upset the delicate balance of inter-ethnic relations and the tourist
industry. Khadzi, at that time rector of the Sofia madrassah, accused Gendzhev of
playing with fire. Allegations that extremist teachers are active in schools have become
more common. During the renewed leadership disputes insinuations that rivals are
linked with terrorists have become the stock in trade, which has done little to improve
the public image of Muslims. The press, in particular Ataka's Monitor, continue to stoke
the fires, as in February 2007 when the Security Service quite unjustifiably detained
four members and closed two websites of the Sofia office of the Union of Muslims in
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVIII, 1 (February 2008)

page 60

Bulgaria following allegations that it had links with Wahabis and with a Jordanian
expelled six years previously, was funded from abroad, and urged jihad. All these
accusations were discovered to be unfounded. The union's .purpose was to counter
extremism and wage jihad against evil in their souls. An inflammatory article in
Monitor was taken up by other papers, claiming that Bulgaria was functioning as a
regional headquarters of terror, thanks to the political protection of the MRF, BSP and
SIINM.4
Admittedly, some Bulgarian Turks were among those arrested in 2005 in
Germany after a failed terrorist attack there but these were completely
unrepresentative. It is among some younger Pomaks, a marginalised group, that there
have been indications of a serious attempt to emulate the stricter Arab-style Islam, but
the numbers involved are small and they do not have the approval of their elders!
It is unfortunate that events outside Bulgaria have exacerbated (and will
continue to do so) relations between Muslims and the Bulgarian majority, since their
peaceful co-existence for well over a century in independent Bulgaria provides a
valuable model in a Europe whose nations are now having to cope with significant
Muslim minorities. Muslims helped bring about the downfall of communism and have
since made a considerable joint contribution to national recovery and to the stability
of Bulgaria's political scene. They were also responsible for the formulation of
guidelines to govern relations between the state and religious confessions which were
acceptable to other minority religions and which had they been adopted would have
greatly improved Bulgaria's international human rights standing. It is to be hoped that
the majority of Bulgarians will acknowledge the considerable achievements of their
Muslim minority and not, as some regrettably do, choose to remain unaware of it.
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